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COMMENTS

THE WHY OF WRITTEN OPINIONS IN THE APPELLATE
COURT IN CASES AFFIRMED
An article over the signature of W. W. Thornton, Esq., a
veteran of the Indianapolis Bar, appearing in the December
issue of the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, entitled "Written Opinions
in Cases Affirmed," has provoked much comment, pro and con,
in the profession. A casual canvass would lead one to conclude
that the author of the article expresses the sentiments of a very
lean minority of the bar by the inveighment against detailed
opinions by the Appellate Court in cases where there is no
statutory or constitutional duty imposed to render them. True,
in part, the author correctly reflects the general sentiment of
the bar that many, if not most, of the opinions are inordinately
and unnecessarily lengthy to be of maximum utility in the
administration of justice; but to reprehend the undue length
of opinions is quite different from advocacy of no opinions at all
in affirmed cases. It is believed that the article in question is
based largely on a misconception of the function of written
opinions. The ground upon which the constitutional provision
for written opinions by the Supreme Court is placed, according
to the author, lends strong support to that belief. It is postulated that at the time of the constitutional convention of 1850
there existed
"antagonistic feeling toward our courts. It was then felt they worked too
much in the dark, and that their decisions should be set forth in the full
light of the day."

Historical support for this premise is lacking.
From the beginning of the sessions of the Supreme Court
under the Constitution of 1816, the first session being May 5,
1817, every decision of the Supreme Court was accompanied by
written opinion, whether affirmance or reversal was the judgment. There was then no constitutional requirement that this
be so, and the legislative mandate on the subject was of a nature
practically resting the sole determination in the court as to what
should, and what should not, carry with it the dignity of a
written opinion, as note the following statute:
"The opinions and determinations of said (Supreme) Court shall be in.
writing, except in cases and on subjects unimportantin nature, which opin-

ions and determinations shall be recorded by the clerk, in a book kept for
that purpose."'
1 153 Rev. Laws Ind. 1831 Sec. 23.
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The legislature had not provided for the publication of these
opinions, and Judge Isaac Blackford, the John Marshall of the
Indiana Supreme Court, on his own initiative, brought out the
first printed volume of the opinions of the court in November,
1830, covering the first ten years of the court's existence. It
will be observed that the first and succeeding volumes of Blackford's Reports contain opinions in a great many more cases
than we are accustomed to find reported in any single modern
volume of the same size. This is due to the remarkable brevity
of some of the opinions. Yet, of none can it be said that it is a
memorandum opinion. Each determines, and exhibits the
determination, of some one or more questions of law.
At the constitutional convention of 1850, the judiciary committee discussions brought out only four points of criticism
against the workings of the court under the Constitution of
1816: firstly, under the old Constitution, by virtue whereof the
membership of the court was appointive, at least two incompetent judges had been benched for political reasons solely;
secondly, the long delay in the rendition of decisions owing to
insufficiency of personnel on the bench; thirdly (and these last
two points are very pertinent to the subject under survey), the
undue delay in publication of written opinions of the court with
resultant paucity of precedent to guide the bench and bar of
the State; and, fourthly, the failure of the court, in opinions as
published, to cover the entire case, and all of the points involved
which resulted in other cases being brought up for review of
questions already decided, but not published, in cases precedent.
A complement of this criticism was the newspaper comment of
the day that Judge Blackford was putting entirely too much
time on his reports to the neglect of his official duties; that he
was making a large amount of momey out of his reports.2 It
was this condition and this criticism that brought about the
inclusion in the Constitution of 1851 of the provisions: (a)
making the judges elective; (b) permitting an increase in the
membership of the court from three to five; (c) that all decisions should be in writing and go to each question arising in the
record; and (d) that
"The general Assembly shall provide, by law, for the speedy publication of the decisions of the Supreme Court made under this constitution;

but no judge shall be allowed to report such decisions."
2 The Supreme Court, 1816-1853, Vol. 1, Courts and Lawyers of Indiana,
Monks, pp. 175-246.

History of Indiana,Esarey, 516 et. seq.
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It must be borne in mind that at the time of the convention
of 1850, there were only seven volumes of Blackford's Reports
in publication, and upon those seven volumes the bench and bar
of the State had to rely for Indiana common law to determine
all cases. The complaint was that there was unwholesome
lack of precedent, by which the bar might advise its clients--the bench decide cases coming before it. Reports from other
states, excepting Ohio, New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, Illinois and Kentucky, were not easily got by lawyers. Moreover,
from the states indicated, the reports did not number over 175 in
the aggregate. It was also quite common for a learned member
of the bar of that time to have pending before the Supreme
Court a case involving some question of law, undecided, so far
as published precedents might disclose, particularly involving some statutory or constitutional construction, which, in
casual discussion with a brother member of some distant county,
he would learn the Supreme Court had determined, but not by
written opinion, some three, four or even ten years before. This
was an exasperating situation, and the lawyers on the judiciary committee of the Convention of 1850 (and with a single
exception the committee was recruited entirely from the bar)
fostered on these grounds a movement for reform that would
eradicate this anomoly.
Now that we are somewhat set right in respect to the historical background of the subject, let us turn to the question
of utility and purpose of written opinions, and, in this connection, it is well again to point out that it is from the written
opinions that we obtain that vast body of common law without
which society, in its present complexity, could not function with
orderliness. In limine we are led to speculate on how much
more difficult it would be to practice law in Indiana today, without the large body of published decisions on cases affirmed by
the Appellate Court. As demonstrative of the usefulness of
opinions in affirmed cases, we hoist Mr. Thornton by his own
petard. He bemoans the fact that in the eighty-fourth volume
pages are devoted to
of the Appellate Court reports, 435
opinions on affirmance. Que utile? Let us examine some of
them: Taking the first case affirmed, that of Payne, Agent, v.
Vise, at page 1. A very important question was settled by this
opinion, of general benefit to the public of the state. In Oleson
v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 143 Ind. 405, and in Ft. Wayne, etc.,
Traction Co. v. Schoeff, 56 Ind. App. 540, the Supreme and
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Appellate Courts, respectively, had laid down rules of law
applicable to the subject of contributory negligence (as a matter
of law) which threw the profession into considerable confusion
in similar cases. By the Payne case, the Appellate Court
cleared up this doubt, so far as it could in the circumstances,
and left with courts and bar a reasonably intelligible rule to
follow in similar cases which occur almost weekly. A rule of
law and procedure was laid down on this troublesome subject
which has the force and effect of a legislative enactment (at
least until the legislature should act), in view of the fact that
the Supreme Court denied a petition to transfer the cause. Regardless of what side the decision may hurt most (plaintiff
or defendant), has not society in this state reaped plentiful as
a result of the clarification laid down by this decision? Should
we not continue to have with us the apparently perplexing conflict between Oleson v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., Fort Wayne,
etc., Traction Co. v. Schoeff, and Indiana Union Traction Co.
v. Love, 180 Ind. 442, to deal with except for this decision?
Would not the commonweal be much at disadvantage without
this decision?
In the next case in this volume, Charters v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 84 Ind. App. 15, the Appellate Court adds something to
the interpretation of Sec. 309 Burns 1926-the tolling provision of the statute of limitations. While not exactly pronouncing a new principle of interpretation or construction, predicated on this statute, it does materially assist the bench and
bar of the state to a more specific definition of what constitutes
"concealment of a cause of action," within the terms of the
statute, so as to operate as a tolling of the limitations. It would
be exceedingly poor judgment to have omitted such a decision
from the published opinions of the court, were it to order such
omission.
The next case affirmed in this volume (P. H. & F. M. Roots
Co. v. Morgan, 84 Ind. App. 32) is a very apt illustration of a
too lngthy opinion. No new question of law was presented, so
far as the decision shows, and it should have been disposed of
in somewhat the following brief manner:
"This is a suit to determine the rights of the parties with reference to
a patent which stood in the name of the appellee. Appellant, by its complaint, averred that appellee had agreed to transfer the patent to appellant,
and asked that appellee be required to effect the transfer. Appellee counterclaimed to have his title to the patent quieted as against any claim of
appellant. Appellant answered to the counter-claim that even though it be
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held that appellant was not entitled to the ownership of the patent, it
should be held that appellant was entitled to make use of and sell articles
manufactured in accordance with the patent without paying any royalty to
appellee. The trial court made a general finding for the appellee on the
issues. There is some conflict in the evidence, but sufficient on each point
to sustain the finding and judgment. We cannot weigh the evidence.
It is, however, contended by appellant that the court erred in adjudging,
(as it did) that while appellant has the right to make non-exclusive use of
the patent, it must, to avail itself of that privilege, pay a reasonable royalty
to appellee. The court found there was an agreement to that effect. The
finding is supported by the evidence. There is nothing for us to do but to
affirm the case. Judgment affirmed."

The syllabus to this case is utterly useless as a statement of
law. It does not even purport to state any proposition of law.
The most that can be gleaned from the body of the decision by
way of legal propositions are the following well-settled rules of
appellate jurisdiction: (a) The Appellate Court will not weigh
conflicting evidence; (b) where the finding and judgment of
the trial court is supported by some evidence, the reviewing
court will not disturb the judgment.
The Appellate Court held, In re Boyer, 65 Ind. App. 408,
that a workman on a traveling wheat-threshing outfit was under
the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act notwithstanding Section 9, providing that the act should not apply
"To farm or agricultural employees

.

.

.

nor to employers of such

persons, unless such employees and their employers file with the Industrial
Board their voluntary joint election so to be bound."

In the case of Dowery v.-State, 84 Ind. App. 37, the appellants' decedent was an employee of the Indiana Girls' School
"whose duties as such employee were limited to work in the operation of the
farm, and received an injury as a result of an accident which arose out
of and in the course of his employment."

It was held that, notwithstanding the Boyer case, the deceased
did not come within the provisions of the act. A distinction is
attempted, but here is a glaring instance where an opinion
would have been helpful, but for a failure of the opinion to
disclose in just what circumstances the deceased met his injury.
The written opinion has missed its purpose because too brief.
Was he threshing grain? Was he cutting corn-fodder? Was
he operating a buzz-saw, or what? As the opinion stands, we
admit it is of practically no value to the bar of the state in
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general, though the Industrial Board doubtless profits by it
because it has the facts in its files. But whereas this opinion
should not have been omitted, it may as well have suffered
oblivion because it fails to state sufficient facts to be of value
in the application of the law. An addition of three or four
words may have sufficed to transmute this case from an unwarranted preemption of space to a valuable rule of law.
American Mills Company v. Fifer, Treas., 84 Ind. App. 41, is
the next case in this volume affirmed. It is not a decision
which we would see omitted, but it could well be cut down to
twenty or thirty lines of opinion and not consume, as it does,
three and a quarter pages.
Enough illustrations have been given of the contents of this
volume (placed on exhibition by Mr. Thornton as an evil example) to demonstrate the fallacy of his contention. It would
not be, however, inappropos to touch on the underlying reasons
of written opinions in all cases. To begin with, the rights of
the inhabitants of this, as of every other state in the Union,
are determined (either in or ex foro) five times by precedent
(whether on affirmed or reversed decision) of the courts of last
resort, where they are determined once by statute. And if the
common law of written opinions be extended to statutory interpretation, construction and application, the ratio would be easily
doubled in favor of the common law. What a chaos would
ensue but for written judicial opinions! What determination
to come to with the indefiniteness of, say, the Code Napoleon
and its problematical construction upon which to wager a great
enterprise or undertaking in the sea of incertitude!
We are more than a little impatient with the judge who
employs sixty pages to write an opinion which six should suffice
to cover. We are equally impatient with the court which,
through mental inertia, will dispose of a case in six lines when it
should have written six pages-the court which will pertly say,
"Affirmed on the decision of Holland v. Hummell, 43 Ind. App.
358," when, as a matter of law, the appellant has duly presented
ten important and novel questions of general interest to every
member of the bar in the state, not one of which is remotely
involved or touched upon in Holland v. HummeUl. We are likewise impatient with the lawyers (usually those who do little
Appellate Court practice) who would compress all the common
law into three convenient volumes with an elaborate index, not
realizing that it would take three thousand volumes to make
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proper application of the excerpts so that they may become a
moving force-a vital guide, a source of declaration of right
and wrong assimilable by the body politic. Against these considerations, how inconsequential does it strike one when complaint is made that so many opinions entail more work and
more expense in outlay for the tools with which to carry on
the work. Galileo with his crude (but simple) telescope in the
seventeenth century discovered the four satellites of Jupiter, but
Pettit at Mount Wilson could only determine the fluctuations in
the amount of ultra-violet radiation emitted by the sun through
the medium of complicated apparatus costing hundreds of thousands of dollars, but would it be seemly in the modern astronomer to decry the expense that intermediate discoveries and
invention has placed on twentieth century researches in the
profession of astronomy? Is greater certainty in astronomy
more important than more certitude in the administration of
justice?
So far as we have been dealing with the utility-the valuethe indispensability, of the written opinion on the public welfare. The welfare and contentment of the individual litigant
and his advocate should bear some consideration, not as respects
the publication of the opinion, so much as its actual rendition.
Can a more plausible ground for disgruntlement of the advocate with our reviewing courts be pointed to than the all too
frequent practice of a case affirmed against him without opinion,
after he has laboriously worked up an appeal on six or seven
profoundly interesting questions of law, vitally affecting the
rights of his client? Yet, it is safe to say, such an event happens almost every time the Appellate Court affirms a case without opinion. Unquestionably occasion occurs where the decision
is affirmed without opinion because no question is properly
preserved or presented by the record. But, how easily and
speedily could that be stated in the opinion, briefly pointing out
in what respect the appellant has failed to preserve or present
his question? The physical exertion, or the space involved, in
so setting forth the fact, would be negligible. Judges of our
courts of review who have been reproached with this matter
often dismiss the subject by somewhat the following justification:
"Frequently there are presented to us records so inartificially prepared
that there has been neither preservation of nor proper presentation of any
question at all. A decision pointing out such infirmity in the record could
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only humiliate the attorney for the appellant in the eyes of his client and
colleagues. In order to spare his feelings, we render a per curiam memorandum opinion. Of course, we expect the attorney to advise his client that
the Appellate Court affirmed the case for purely political reasons or reasons of friendship, without opinion, because of trepidation to make public
the lame logic to -which resort must be had to write up the facts and affirm
thereon."

We believe it is high time for this sort of charity to cease.
If a member of the bar is so unskillful that he cannot properly
conduct a case in the court of appeal, his feelings should not
be consulted in making that fact public. Point it out to him,
and to all the bar, to the end that, (a) the lawyer will not again
repeat the error; and (b) that other members of the bar may
be fore-armed against commission of the same mistake. Suppose the multitude of principles of law under the heading
"Appeal and Error"-mostly enounced in affirmed cases-were
not available to the bar because the court of appeal desired to
spare the feelings of the appellants' counsel. Could even the
most seasoned practitioner average more than an "affirmance
per curiam"? The mistakes and errors made by others, In
bringing a case to the reviewing court, enables the bar generally to avoid them by the landmarks of precedent. Furthermore, it is less humiliating for the attorney to advise his client,
when reading the opinion pointing out the failure of preservation or presentation of his appeal, that the case was affirmed
on a technicality (which the client little understands) than to
be forced to the admission that he erroneously advised his client
on a point of law.
No, not more, but less per curiam memoranda affirmances is
what the bench nisi and the bar asks of the Appellate Court.
More decisions on all points of law presented. Less complexity
and marathon lengthy opinions; more conciseness and completeness, by all means. Six or seven pages covering inconsequential
recitals of the pleadings, when six or seven lines would suffice
to bring in bold and uncomplicated relief the questions at issue
-be they of practice or of substance-would be welcome. More
of the brevity of Blackford's Reports, qvide the first volume, as
in Durham v. State, p. 33, 11/2 pages; Bond v. Patterson,p. 34,
11/ pages; Blaclkford v. Peltier,p. 36, 1 page; Morris v. State,
1 page; Sturgeon v.. State, 1/2 page; Dougherty v. Campbell, 1
page;; Crenshaw v. Bullitt, 11/4 pages; Connor v. President, 3
pages; Jones v. Cooprider, 2 pages. The decision in the first
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volume of Blackford which extends over 3 pages is the exception; the rule is I and 11/2 pages. Every opinion, it appears,
fully decides the points presented. It adds to the body of the
law. Give us more suck decisions, less memoranda affirmances.

Of the South Bend Bar.

G. A. FARABAUGH,
WALTER R. ARNOLD.

